The Cold War Comes Home

Trump’s 51^st state claims on Canada should not be just seen as irrational threats without cause. A genuine, albeit colonial, rationale for this claim lies in the broader geostrategic context of the Arctic. Here is what Canadians need to know about the Arctic and why tensions will heat up as the ice melts. 

The Arctic is a cultural cornerstone for Canada, but during the Cold War was an avenue for destruction. The fear of the Soviet nuclear bomber fleet, then its nuclear missile arsenal, required cooperation with the United States for continental defence. Cooperation took the form of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). However, unlike the conflicts of decades past, the Arctic today is no longer characterized only as a missile highway, but by its natural resources and lucrative maritime trade routes. I call this shift the ‘Longitude to Latitude, the new East-West Security Axis’. 

This shift is from nuclear weapons flying over the Arctic towards naval and air supremacy over Arctic maritime routes. Three Arctic maritime routes are emerging as the ice melts. The first route is the Northwest Passage, shared by the US, Canada, and Greenland. The second is the North Sea Route (NSR) that goes through Russian waters. Last is the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) that cuts through the Arctic Ocean and will likely remain an international strait, albeit a contested one.

To understand why the United States under Trump is claiming Canada and Greenland, Russia’s pivot to Asia is key. Russia aims to shift trade to Asia and strengthen its position as a natural resource power. The Arctic maritime routes are significantly shorter than the traditional maritime routes such as the Suez and Panama. This cuts down travel time between Europe and Asia by up to 40 percent and reduces fuel costs, increasing overall trade.

Russian strategy is designed to enable and secure east-west travel along the  NSR and project power into the TSR. 

Map of three Arctic Routes, The Arctic Institute

The investments aim to cover Russia’s entire Arctic coast and islands with anti-access/area denial capabilities, including anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles. These measures come in addition to modernizing airbases and naval ports, including converting civilian infrastructure into dual-use facilities. The result is that the NSR and parts of the TPR are forcefully being converted to Russian waters. As a result, anyone who wishes to enter will need their permission and while Russia carves out additional territory to extract natural resources uncontested. 

Why does Russian activity in the Arctic matter to Canada? A quick look at Arctic maritime routes shows that Russia controls territory adjacent to two of the three main passages, leaving Canada’s Northwest Passage as the only major route not under Russian influence. Canada claims this passage as its own, a position disputed by the United States. From a broader geopolitical perspective, the U.S. champions the principle of free navigation through international straits, often asserting this through Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), such as those conducted in the South China Sea. This raises an important question: why does the U.S. challenge Canadian sovereignty in the Northwest Passage instead of conducting FONOPs through Russia’s Northern Sea Route or the Transpolar Route? The answer lies in accessibility and risk. 

In the South China Sea, China is still building up its military presence through artificial islands, but the region is surrounded by U.S. allies and bases, making it more secure for U.S. operations. In contrast, Russia already has a deeply entrenched and heavily militarized presence along its Arctic coastline, making any operation in those waters significantly more difficult and provocative. While some would say Russian power is being drained in Ukraine, its Arctic investments have yet to slow; and despite Russia having drawn ground forces from its Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (now the Leningrad Military District), its overall strength continues to grow. 

This means the Canadian route - less fortified, more navigable, and politically less risky - becomes the path of least resistance. As a result, Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic will remain, and likely grow, as a source of tension between the U.S. and Canada, precisely because it is the geopolitically safest option for the U.S. to assert its navigation rights.

 Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer explains the situation as “No one is claiming rival ownership. Instead, the United States government asserts the right for ships and aircraft to transit through Canada’s Arctic waters and the narrow air corridor above them without asking our permission. Canada insists that this right to transit passage does not exist without other actors first securing our permission”. Canadian government Arctic policy documents from the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs and Global Affairs Canada indicate that Canada's position is to cooperate and solve its Arctic longstanding dispute with the US. Yet, this begs the question of how much Canada can give up in any negotiations without degrading its sovereignty. In 2018, Dr. Suzanne Lalonde - a specialist on the Law of the Sea - wrote a Senate briefing on the Arctic legal debate that Russia’s position on Arctic sovereignty “is almost the perfect mirror of the Canadian legal position” as Russia has the military strength to contest opposition to its claims, Canada does not.  

Despite these geopolitical challenges, can Canada afford to play hardball with its Arctic sovereignty forever? The answer depends on defence spending and priority. Although the Carney government has promised increased defence spending, the historical nature of the Canadian public and governments suggests a continuation of the status quo. Canadian defence priorities are currently split between NATO commitments in Latvia, NORAD modernization, and rebuilding the CAF in general. The CAF will need Arctic-capable aircraft, ships, vehicles, infrastructure, and people while also upholding its other commitments. Canada cannot afford to be everywhere without massive, long-term commitments of public support and funding. 

However, defence spending doesn’t come cheap, and Canadians are keenly aware of the costs associated with Canadian social policies. Time will tell if the public's renewed interest in defence will last or waver as it always has. Canada’s recent concession of removing the Digital Sales Tax in trade talks signals a worrying future for other disputes with the United States. It is unlikely that the United States will annex Canada, but if our pattern of conceding continues, we may face a future where we give up our Arctic sovereignty or grant the United States favourable terms in the Arctic. 

Written By: Justin Nakao, Policy Strategist, Engage